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Introduction: Accountability Amidst 
Fragility, Conflict, and Violence: 
Learning from Recent Cases*
Anuradha Joshi1
Abstract Conflict, violence, and fragility exacerbate the difficulties faced 
by poor and marginalised people, particularly in influencing the policy 
decisions that affect their lives. Comparing five cases in conflict-affected 
contexts, this introduction highlights a number of approaches. It emphasises 
the importance of distinguishing processes of accountability from those 
of empowerment, and recognising the complexities of the relationships 
between them. It highlights how the dynamic nature of contexts of 
fragility, violence, and conflict constrain citizen action but simultaneously 
offer opportunities for civic actors to form coalitions with new actors and 
movements. It underscores the value in viewing accountability gains within 
the longer historical trajectory of particular conflicts. Finally, it illustrates 
the core importance of narratives and framing in driving collective action 
and embedding the legitimacy of claims. The cases highlight that progress 
towards accountability is often transitory and partial, but together also 
foreground key issues that are relevant for understanding empowerment 
and accountability processes.
Keywords: citizen action, fragility, violence, conflict, post-conflict, 
accountability, empowerment.
1 Introduction
Fragility, conflict, and violence are increasingly common features of  
countries suffering from high levels of  poverty and under-development 
(OECD 2018). Estimates by the World Bank suggest that by 2030, 
about half  of  the world’s poor will live in contexts of  fragility and 
conflict.2 Such contexts are often ones where state institutions are 
weak, fragmented, and lack legitimacy;3 where non-state actors control 
territory and often provide services, and where civic space is limited 
and uneven. The big question is: under these circumstances, whether, 
how, and under what conditions can citizen-led action lead to more 
accountable and responsive institutions (state or non-state)?
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Historically, in countries with stable/consolidated states, accountability 
and responsiveness to marginalised groups have often emerged through 
grass-roots struggles – bear in mind the civil rights movement in the US 
and the apartheid movement in South Africa. Those struggles are well-
studied signposts in the history of  progress and have been markers of  how 
we think about transformational change. Drawing from those historical 
experiences and others, a substantial body of  literature on accountability 
emerged that highlighted the centrality of  information to accountability 
claims (Fox 2007; Fung, Graham and Weil 2007), the importance of  
facilitation or mediation of  citizen claims (Barr et al. 2012; von Lieres 
and Piper 2014; Shankland 2014), vertical integration, coalition building 
(Fox 2016), multi-pronged approaches (Joshi 2017), and the need to think 
of  accountability as a long-term political process that shifts relationships 
between citizens and states (Joshi and Houtzager 2012). Yet, these insights 
have been borne out of  the experiences of  relatively stable states.
Much has changed in the last 20 years. Two decades ago, there was 
an air of  optimism around the possibilities of  gaining accountability 
through empowerment from below. There was an assumption that it 
was just a matter of  time before countries affected by authoritarianism, 
conflict, and fragility would move towards democracy and related 
accountabilities. At present, we observe the opposite: increasingly, 
relatively robust democracies are becoming less so – nationalism, 
populism, and religious fundamentalism are on the rise. There has been 
a seismic shift in the ways in which both citizens and state institutions 
can connect and mobilise through the internet and related social media 
(McGee et al. 2018; McGee and Edwards 2016).
Consequently, sources of  information are multiple and often 
contradictory, making it difficult to base behaviour on facts. Growing 
inequality in most regions of  the world widens class divides and 
undermines visions of  a common future. Fragility, conflict, and 
violence seem to be spreading rather than receding. And there has 
been a growing distrust in state institutions throughout the world, a 
feature that is heightened in settings of  fragility, violence, and conflict. 
This makes the challenge of  understanding and conceptualising the 
potential for social and political action and its effects on empowerment 
and accountability in these kinds of  contexts even more urgent and 
daunting. How far do our insights from stable settings hold?
The Action for Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA) research 
programme under which this research was undertaken makes a small 
start towards this enormous task of  understanding how progress can 
be made on empowerment and accountability in fragile, conflict-, and 
violence-affected settings (FCVAS).4 What this IDS Bulletin hopes to 
do is to look back at recent history and identify insights from relatively 
recent experiences of  grass-roots struggles and related social and 
political change that contributed to transitory progress towards greater 
accountability of  public institutions in these contexts. We say ‘transitory 
progress’ because examples of  unqualified successes are rare, and it 
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seems too early to tell whether the progress viewed today is likely to 
continue. In many of  the cases presented here, the changes observed 
have been partial, uneven, and fragile – with setbacks already observed 
in some cases, and real possibilities of  reversals in others. Yet, even these 
accounts of  partial progress can tell us something about the pathways 
through which accountability might be sought and strengthened, and 
the conditions that enable fruitful navigation of  the uncertain and 
changing terrain in fragile, conflict-, and violence-affected contexts.
The five cases presented here – transition to democracy in Myanmar, 
civilian action in pre- and post-conflict Colombia, the anti-corruption 
protests in Guatemala, the lawyers’ movement for judicial autonomy in 
Pakistan, and the spread of  the ‘Right to Food’ campaign to subnational 
levels in India – were chosen as they are cases where we can see some 
progress on pathways towards accountability, however nascent or 
temporary. We prioritised accountability in the case selection because 
these cases are rare, and require a shift in citizen–state relations. Each 
case explores the dynamics of  empowerment and accountability, and 
their interactions.
The cases represent a variety of  histories of  conflict and potential 
pathways to accountability through political and institutional change: 
from the oldest running civil conflict in the world in Myanmar, to the 
relatively recent post-conflict peace in Colombia, to the geographically 
localised conflicts witnessed in India’s Naxal-affected states. They range 
from long-standing authoritarian regimes such as Myanmar, to countries 
where military rule has alternated with periods of  democracy as is the 
case in Pakistan, to formal democracies such as India. The reasons for the 
ongoing conflicts also vary in substance – including among the immediate 
causes: the rise of  religious fundamentalism in Pakistan, repressive 
regimes targeting ethnic groups such as the case of  Guatemala, and more 
extreme left-oriented movements such as the Naxalites in India.
Collectively, the articles in this IDS Bulletin highlight four key issues that are 
central in understanding how accountability pathways unfold in contexts 
of  fragility, violence, and conflict. First, processes of  accountability have 
to be distinguished from processes of  empowerment and strengthening 
agency. Empowerment gains might be achieved without gaining 
accountability, and, (though less likely) institutional responsiveness might 
not lead to any empowerment. Understanding the conditions that will 
foster empowerment and accountability processes independently is 
important in order to get better analytical purchase on the outcomes we 
observe. And the outcomes themselves are more likely to be precursors, 
such as overcoming fear and building trust, to the more conventional 
empowerment and accountability outcomes that are expected.
Second, the cases show how the particular dynamic nature of  these 
contexts – fragility, violence, and conflict – is constraining; but can 
simultaneously offer opportunities for civic actors to form coalitions with 
new actors and movements that enable some traction in the struggle for 
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public accountability. At critical junctures, the institutional constraints 
on agency are momentarily relaxed and provide openings for new 
configurations of  power to be sought and in some cases established 
(Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Capoccia 2015; Capoccia and Kelemen 
2007; Houtzager 2003).
However, such coalitions by their nature are tricky and constantly in 
flux; and point to the staggered, non-linear nature of  progress – where 
gains can be made as well as lost within a short period of  time. Indeed, 
the cases suggest that any progress in the pathways to accountability 
inevitably invite backlash: in at least three of  the countries – Guatemala, 
Myanmar, and Colombia – there has been serious backsliding regarding 
accountability since the cases were selected and written up. In the other 
two countries – India and Pakistan – there has been a serious shrinkage 
of  civic space for activism of  the kind described here.
Third, the cases underscore that although such contexts are 
characterised by rapidly changing political and policy configurations, 
episodes of  claim-making and resistance have to be viewed within the 
longer historical trajectory of  conflict in order to understand why and 
how they occur, and the impacts they might have. This includes prior 
experiences with collective mobilisation, the generational internalisation 
of  fear and trauma, and the constraints those place on people’s agency. 
Simultaneously, those experiences require an examination of  the 
governance structures – the basis on which those holding power have 
exercised authority over time without constantly resorting to force. The 
‘stickiness’ of  institutional and people’s responses in the conflict period 
circumscribe the actions of  both public authorities and people in the 
present. Specifying precisely how one affects the other is a task taken up 
by several articles.
Fourth and finally, following the broader social movements literature, 
these analyses of  political and institutional change in FCVAS 
foreground the role of  narratives in driving collective action and 
embedding the legitimacy of  claims. Particularly in FCVAS, where 
the formal and rational might have less traction than in stable political 
environments, ideas and emotions seem to be particularly important in 
mobilising people. Obviously, this is not a new strategy, especially for 
political entrepreneurs, parties, and social movements. Yet, these cases 
show ways in which new framings can help create new allies, build 
coalitions, and mobilise the general public.
Before elaborating on these issues, we need to clarify conceptually how 
accountability processes in FCVAS might be different from more stable 
settings. Section 2 takes up this task.
2 Rethinking accountability processes in FCVAS
In the past few years, there has been a lot of  attention paid to 
understanding how citizen-led social and political action might lead to 
accountability. Often under the rubric of  ‘social accountability’, we have 
IDS Bulletin Vol. 50 No. 3 September 2019 ‘Accountability Amidst Fragility, Conflict, and Violence: Learning from Recent Cases’ 1–16 | 5
Institute of Development Studies | bulletin.ids.ac.uk
new insights into the value of  vertical integration of  pro-accountability 
efforts, the importance of  scaling up local successes through various 
pathways, and the need for alliances with strategic pro-reform actors 
both within and outside the state at different levels (Aceron 2018; Fox 
2007, 2015, 2016; Pande 2008; Pande and Houtzager 2016). Yet, 
most of  these insights emerge from relatively well-functioning settings 
– with cohesive and effective states, well-established civic and political 
institutions, open societies, relatively free media, vibrant civil societies, 
and at least some adherence to formal rules and processes. How well do 
these insights matter in FCVAS?
Our starting point in this IDS Bulletin is that because contexts affected by 
fragility, violence, and conflict differ significantly from more stable ones, 
we are likely to observe different processes at work here, particularly 
in relation to empowerment and accountability, as even the terms 
‘empowerment’ and ‘accountability’ need to be understood contextually. 
Why? Three reasons stand out.
First, the features of  context. In the places we are examining, significant 
parts of  the country, often in the borderlands, are affected by fragility, 
conflict, and violence. These are places where state capacity to deliver 
public services is low, state institutions are weakly embedded, and parts 
of  the country have little or no state presence; what O’Donnell (1994) 
terms ‘brown areas’ or others have termed areas of  ‘limited statehood’ 
(Risse and Stollenwerk 2018; Risse, Börzel and Draude 2018). The 
pockets of  fragility, violence, and conflict do not mean that the state 
itself  is weak (where it is weak, however, it is by definition a brown area); 
often, it is authoritarian, with a strong capacity for repression.
Such states rely on external or point sources of  revenue (e.g. aid or 
extractives). Democracy remains nominal at the level of  regular 
elections, sometimes only a little less than free and fair, but there is little 
in the form of  a deeper democratic culture. In the pockets of  FCVAS, 
alternative sources of  authority often coexist or dominate in the form 
of  armed/non-armed groups based on ethnicity/religious or private 
interests that often overlap. Informal actors, institutions, and processes 
prevail, and power flows through non-formal, invisible channels that 
circumscribe action. Ethnic, religious, and other intersecting identities 
trump over secular, citizenship-based ones.
And social norms and perceptions of  particular actors shape attitudes 
and behaviour in terms of  action for accountability. Simultaneously, the 
internalisation of  fear and trauma borne out of  long periods of  conflict 
and violence lead people to self-censor – and inaction manifests as a 
rational strategy for the poor and most marginalised: what Pettit (2016) 
calls ‘civic habitus’. In such areas, ‘ruling’ or ‘governance’, that is, the 
process through which social coordination occurs in order to produce 
and implement collectively binding rules or public goods, depends upon 
the legitimacy of  state (or non-state) actors, as it enables rule without 
constantly resorting to force.
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For nascent democracies such as Myanmar or South Sudan, with 
limited capacities and untested political settlements, such legitimacy has 
been posited as critical for stability and preventing deterioration into 
further conflict; for example, see the recent report of  the Commission 
on State Fragility, Growth and Development (2018). Yet, as many 
authors have noted, there are diverse sources of  legitimacy, beyond 
the traditional sources of  input, process, output, and legal legitimacy 
– including social trust, traditional or religious, ethnic identity-based, 
or even charismatic leadership-based legitimacy. In areas of  limited 
statehood, Risse and Stollenwerk (2018) suggest that ‘empirical 
legitimacy’ – the social acceptance by the population of  the state’s right 
to rule – is critical for understanding governance effectiveness, as the 
presence of  such empirical legitimacy leads to voluntary compliance. 
In ‘brown areas’ or areas of  ‘limited statehood’, the big question then 
is how to understand the conditions and processes through which 
low-trust, low-legitimacy environments can be moved to be more 
accountable and evolve into higher trust, more empirically legitimate, 
accountability-oriented environments.
Second, given the challenges of  the contextual conditions described 
above, social and political action for accountability cannot be expected 
to occur in predictable forms. The limited space for civil society means 
that action is likely to take grass-roots, customary, spontaneous, and 
cultural forms. Disruption, non-traditional forms of  protest and, at least 
on the face of  it, seeming lack of  organisation are features that we are 
likely to observe. The locations of  such collective action are also likely to 
be non-traditional – virtually rather than in face-to-face organisations, 
anonymously rather than through known opposition groups, or through 
old repertoires appropriated by unexpected actors.
Such action is more likely to be nebulous and fluid, or even ‘eruptive’, 
and connections between action in different spaces less obvious. 
Violence itself  might be a form of  social and political action, viewed as 
a last resort for people who are desperate. The targets of  action are also 
diverse – from state institutions to non-state actors, including religious 
bodies, armed groups, or private sector actors – and might involve 
seeking to mobilise some of  them to influence others.
Finally, the big challenge is defining what is empirically meant by 
accountability, or even a reasonable expectation of  what accountability 
might look like in such settings – how will we know it when we see 
it? Accountability might not even have the same meaning given the 
differences in culture, experience, and expectations. Expecting that 
public officials will routinely provide justifications for their actions 
to the populace and accept any judgements and sanctions/rewards 
rendered (the traditional definition of  accountability) in these settings 
is improbable. So realistically, we are unlikely to observe the clear 
and big accountability gains that social and political action has led 
to in stable settings, such as the right to information in India or the 
institutionalisation of  participatory governance councils in Brazil.
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In fact, we are unlikely to even get the kinds of  smaller gains made by 
localised social accountability initiatives that have been tried in many 
countries. Rather, we are more likely to encounter the need for fostering 
enabling environments – that is, some public transparency, space 
for civic action, and so forth – that are precursors to empowerment 
and accountability. And progress on overcoming fear and trauma; 
incremental trust building; developing citizens’ awareness and 
expectations of  state institutions; catalysing instances of  responsiveness; 
and bolstering social actors’ cohesion, so that if  and when the broader 
context opens up, they will be better positioned to emerge and grow 
both vertically and horizontally; these are the kinds of  outcomes that we 
can expect and commend.
3 Cases of transitory progress?
The cases presented here represent transitory progress on accountability 
and unpack the interacting roles different sets of  social and political 
actors have played in their relative success. We briefly review the cases, 
before drawing out some thematic lessons in Section 4.
One set of  cases focuses directly on social actors to understand the 
conditions that enable them to achieve their objectives. Flores (this 
IDS Bulletin) traces the case of  recent anti-corruption protests in 
Guatemala by examining the strategies employed by the activists. In 
March 2015, Guatemalan youth, tired of  the corruption exposed 
through a report of  the CICIG (the International Commission Against 
Impunity in Guatemala – a UN-backed autonomous body created to 
look into breaches of  integrity in government) called for a peaceful 
non-partisan protest in the capital under the banner, ‘Renuncia Ya’, 
demanding the immediate resignation of  the president. The response 
to the call was overwhelming and protests continued every Saturday in 
cities across Guatemala until the president was forced to resign. Given 
the long-standing problem of  corruption embedded in public services in 
Guatemala, this was, ten years later, a significant, albeit limited, victory 
for the anti-corruption movement. Yet because of  elite backlash, CICIG 
is now being closed down.
Joshi and Chowdhury (this IDS Bulletin) trace how relatively successful 
national rights campaigns can reach back to the grass roots and mobilise 
in conflict-affected locations. Examining the evolution of  the Right 
to Food (RTF) campaign in the Naxalite-affected states in India, they 
show how social movements fighting for the government to respect 
socioeconomic rights can emerge and thrive in areas where they might 
compete with armed groups (termed left-wing extremists (LWEs) by 
the state), for credibility and support of  local populations. Their ability 
to do so depends, they argue, on the overlap in geographic areas and 
issues between the RTF campaign and armed groups. In the case of  
rights campaigns in India, LWEs did not obstruct the work of  the RTF 
campaign, as LWEs were not able to deliver on the basic needs of  the 
people, due to their limited resources. In fact, the tension between the 
RTF campaign’s goal of  making the state ‘work’ for the people, and the 
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LWEs’ struggles that rejected the legitimacy of  the state, enabled the 
RTF campaign to establish roots in these locations.
Similarly, Khan (this IDS Bulletin) follows the Lawyers’ Movement in 
Pakistan and its efforts towards re-establishing judicial independence 
and empowering the judiciary, from the brief  period between the 
dismissal of  the Chief  Justice in 2007 and the resignation of  President 
Musharraf  in 2009. Identifying five distinct phases of  the movement, 
she shows how the alliances forged between lawyers and the judiciary, 
with the support of  opposition political parties led to re-establishing 
judicial autonomy. And yet, as she shows, the conditions and strategies 
that led to success also ironically later led to the judiciary gaining 
too much power, enabling it to resist calls for its own accountability. 
Further, the alliances forged between sections of  the bar, the bench, and 
opposition parties in the earlier period of  seeking judicial independence, 
were reconfigured in the latter civilian period, and new lines of  cleavage 
opened within the bar and the bench along party political lines.
The remaining articles take a broader look at cases of  accountability 
where there have been transitions to new institutional settings – the 
transition to democracy in Myanmar (Brenner and Schulman, this 
IDS Bulletin) and the progress towards peace in Colombia (Justino, this 
IDS Bulletin). In both, the role of  social actors and their contributions 
to the shifts are not direct or given; they have to be ‘read’ through 
unearthing their contribution over time, from the period of  conflict 
to the post-conflict situation. Both articles argue that how social and 
political actors make demands in the period immediately following 
conflict is shaped by their experiences during the conflict.
Brenner and Schulman (this IDS Bulletin) argue that the long historical 
roots of  the political transition in Myanmar shape the possibilities and 
contours of  social and political action in the present. The role of  the 
British during colonial rule was to exacerbate fragmentation and social 
cleavages through preferential treatment of  ethnic minorities in the 
army, enlisted to control the Bamar population. They show how the 
political transition was orchestrated by the Burmese military skilfully 
consolidating its political and economic power. The role of  social 
and political action in such a context has been limited, fragmented, 
sporadic, and has been consistently opposed by the regime. These 
tensions continue to linger, and greater fragmentation post-transition 
has led not only to a proliferation of  civil actors, but also to a thriving 
‘uncivil’ society which actively fosters social divides and cements narrow 
notions of  identity.
Drawing upon the case of  Colombia, Justino (this IDS Bulletin) describes 
how both guerrilla and paramilitary groups took control over territory 
at different points of  time during the conflict over the past several 
decades. She develops a conceptual typology of  social and political 
action by population, based on whether armed groups are predatory or 
seek to dominate by establishing rules. She further breaks down social 
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and political action in each of  these contexts based on the institutional 
and economic capacity of  social actors, as well as whether their interests 
are aligned with those of  the armed group or not. Using this typology 
and evidence of  population response to rule in Colombia, she argues 
that those social groups that were able to resist armed groups during the 
conflict have been better able to push open space for their participation 
in the peace process. Yet those same activists committed to building 
peace in presumably former conflict zones are now at risk from a 
resurgence of  diverse armed actors.
Together these cases offer insights into a range of  issues that are central 
to the empowerment and accountability agenda in contexts of  fragility, 
conflict, and violence. We turn to these in the next four sections.
4 Disentangling empowerment and accountability
Those working on empowerment and accountability tend to assume 
that they are automatically mutually supportive of  one another or 
that they exist in a virtuous cycle. Our cases show that, particularly in 
FCVAS, these more often than not follow distinct paths. We trace some 
of  the issues that are raised by the cases next.
A critical point is who is being empowered (and who might be 
getting disempowered). In FCVAS, as elsewhere, social actors are not 
homogenous and processes of  social and political action that empower 
one group, often do so at the cost of  others. Brenner and Schulman 
(this IDS Bulletin) suggest that in Myanmar, donors who were funding 
civil society groups active in border regions during the pre-transition 
period, started channelling funds in the post-transition period to support 
government programmes, leading to a crisis for organisations who 
were dependent upon aid for their activities. As they show, this has 
led to a debate between donors advocating for continued cross-border 
aid (support to civil society organisations (CSOs) in the borderlands) 
to avoid disruption of  services, and donors propagating aid through 
Yangon and government channels.
Simultaneously, the experience of  resisting during the conflict can 
empower communities to be more active during the post-conflict period. 
In Colombia, Justino (this IDS Bulletin) drawing on Moser (2005) and 
others notes how women who have actively participated in the peace 
process report raised levels of  self-esteem, which leads to a virtuous 
cycle of  greater participation. By contrast, the experiences of  extreme 
violence and repression during the conflict in Guatemala led to an 
atmosphere of  fear and disempowerment in the post-conflict period, 
and it took a new generation of  youth to take to the streets to break the 
cycle of  inaction and demand accountability from the government.
Moreover, the empowered actors in our cases are not always in favour 
of  accountability. As Khan (this IDS Bulletin) shows in the case of  the 
Lawyers’ Movement in Pakistan, the movement was keen to empower 
the judiciary and ensure its independence as a key institution for 
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political accountability, and yet the judiciary, once empowered resisted 
calls for its own accountability. As she summarises pithily, the conditions 
that make lawyers pro-empowerment actors may not make them 
pro-accountability agents.
And accountability itself  in these cases is difficult to assess. There are 
the rare instances of  responses on the part of  the government, but 
though the claims and responses are linked, they represent instances of  
accountability rather than ongoing accountability relationships between 
citizens and the state. In these instances, authorities routinely provide 
information and justification for their actions, opening themselves 
up to the judgement of  the public through a process of  deliberation. 
In Guatemala and Pakistan, the positive response was followed by a 
reversal in terms of  powerful actors preventing pro-accountability 
coalitions from gaining ground.
5 Unexpected coalitions and cleavages
The cases of  transitional success in establishing precursors for 
accountability and empowerment highlighted here also show the 
possibilities for unexpected coalitions for change, as well as the 
development of  new cleavages. In several cases, if  analysed through a 
historical institutionalist lens, there were critical junctures – defined as 
a ‘relatively short period of  time during which there is a substantially 
heightened probability that agents’ choices will affect the outcome 
of  interest’, that opened up the space for pro-accountability forces to 
collaborate through new configurations that challenged the existing 
status quo (Capoccia and Kelemen 2007: 348).
In Guatemala, a reformist public prosecutor backed by the CICIG was 
able to provide credible information on large-scale political corruption 
that contributed to the rise of  the youth protests. This resulted in what 
Jonathan Fox has called a ‘sandwich strategy’, which forced a corrupt 
government out of  office by applying pressure through the reformist 
public prosecutor and the CICIG from above, and through protests 
in the street from below (Fox 2015). And yet, this did not lead to 
consolidation of  the anti-corruption coalition. After the resignation of  
the president, the youth movement splintered into two groups: those 
who supported a neoliberal agenda and those who aligned with the 
traditional left, indigenous, and peasant movements. Neither did the 
alliance between the public prosecutor and CICIG last long – the next 
president ‘directed much of  his government’s energies over the past two 
years to trying to strip CICIG of  its authority’ (Malkin 2019).
Similarly, the Lawyers’ Movement in Pakistan started from an 
unexpected alliance between lawyers and judges reacting to the 
growing public anti-regime sentiment and an attack on the judiciary 
by a person in uniform, borne out of  institutional motivations of  
preserving the institutional autonomy of  both the bar and the bench 
against an extraconstitutional regime (Khan, this IDS Bulletin). And yet 
once the battle was won and autonomy was institutionalised, alliances 
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re-fractured in new ways, creating a situation where only some parts of  
the bar and bench were fighting for accountability. In India, a strategy 
of  constructive engagement with the state on basic food security and 
simultaneous advocacy supported by the national campaign, enabled 
the Right to Food campaign to distinguish itself  from LWE groups at 
the state level, by not taking up the issues of  displacement and land 
rights which were core to the LWEs’ agenda. Yet, since the passing of  
the Right to Food Act in 2014, there has been greater acknowledgement 
of  the need to work on issues of  displacement and land rights by the 
national RTF campaign; at the same time there are new cleavages 
emerging among LWEs, thus blurring the stark LWE/RTF positions 
from the earlier period.
6 History shapes possibilities
It is an oft-repeated refrain that history affects the present; yet we 
need to unpack precisely how it does so. Most obviously, in FCVAS, it 
is history that produced the conflict, fragility, and fragmentation that 
actors have to deal with in the present period. What are the factors 
that linger and cast constraints on actors? Scholarship in the historic 
institutionalist tradition has stressed the staying power of  institutions, 
through the notion of  path dependence – decisions taken at ‘critical 
junctures’ then reconfigure institutions and set in motion a new set of  
constraints within which change once again only happens incrementally.
But in FCVAS settings (and perhaps in others) when viewed from 
an accountability and empowerment lens, a double whammy effect 
might result. In what we might call ‘institutional overhang’, structures 
developed for repression and control become a drag on the new 
democratic processes. Constraints such as fear and reticence that made 
sense and were strategies adapted for a previous political period of  
conflict, become millstones for accountability action in the post-conflict 
setting. Further, often the momentary opening of  space and responses to 
claims – what we might see as accountability gains – turn out to foster 
a new set of  constraints that make future accountability struggles even 
more challenging.
As we see in the cases of  Colombia, Guatemala, and Myanmar, 
identities and fear forged and reinforced during the trauma continue 
to shape behaviours of  the present. In Guatemala, it took a new 
generation of  urban youth to mobilise on social media and challenge 
state structures; far away geographically and temporally from the 
violence experienced in rural areas by the older generation. Brenner 
and Schulman (this IDS Bulletin) take the long view of  the history of  
Myanmar to highlight how British colonial rule set ethnic minorities at 
the border against the heartland Bamar groups. This not only created 
conditions for the conflict post-independence, but also cast a shadow 
over the political transition, limiting possibilities for cooperation as 
advantages and disadvantages have become institutionally embedded 
for different groups. In India, the long history of  the LWE groups and 
their position vis-à-vis working with the state created an opportunity 
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for RTF activists to work on food security despite working in the same 
terrain, and yet the same history limits the possibilities of  what the 
RTF activists can do in the area in terms of  direct confrontation or 
challenges to the state which would be seen akin to ‘terrorist’ activity 
similar to that of  the extremist groups.
7 Framing the narratives
While ideas and narratives about values and imagination have been 
seen as an important tool for mobilising action, particularly in the 
social movement literature (Benford and Snow 2000; Snow and 
Benford 1988; Gamson 1992), they have received less attention in the 
donor and project-focused accountability work which has tended to be 
initially more technical, and only recently more political. Unpacking 
cases of  success as being underpinned by the mobilising power of  
narratives, of  framing claims as stories of  moral rights and wrongs, 
bestowing legitimacy on the claimants through socially accepted moral 
norms – what might be called the contemporary moral economy – is 
relatively recent (Hossain and Scott-Villiers 2017; Hossain and Kalita 
2014; Thompson 1971). And yet, as these cases show, lurking behind 
the processes driven by institutions and interests are stories of  where 
particular frames appear to be galvanised by social actors to advance 
their cause. A few illustrations follow.
In Pakistan, what was initially considered by the populace as a single 
narrow issue, was given different guises at different moments to different 
audiences. As Khan (this IDS Bulletin) writes, the bar leaders played a 
pivotal role in constructing these multiple yet cohesive narratives to 
respond to a rapidly evolving political situation. These efforts were 
supported by a significant moment in the mobilisation when the 
hearings on the case were allowed on camera, as they further served to 
mobilise public opinion, which until then had largely regarded these 
hearings as an issue limited to the courts. Similarly, as we will see, the 
Indian RTF campaign in the Naxal-affected states used the ‘right to 
food’ framing to gather together a range of  development issues that 
different groups were already working on (from subsistence agriculture 
to children’s rights) under a collective umbrella.
This broad church strategy not only gained it a diverse membership, 
but the rights framing also directed efforts at the accountability of  the 
state (the duty bearer), allowing the campaign to underscore that it was 
interested in working with the state to make the state work for the poor, 
rather than posing a threat to its very existence. In Guatemala, the 
students mobilised under the banner of  ‘anti-corruption’, which they 
portrayed as apolitical, a matter of  good governance; thus constructing 
a popular common cause that appealed across class, ethnic, and political 
affiliations. However, as Flores (this IDS Bulletin) outlines, the movement 
later quickly broke up into different ideological streams, diluting the 
movement as well as its broader appeal.
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8 Conclusions
This IDS Bulletin set out to look at recent history for lessons on how 
progress on empowerment and accountability might be made in 
contexts of  fragility, conflict, and violence. The five cases presented here 
offer rough contours of  the issues and their conceptual underpinnings 
that might be relevant for understanding and conceptualising 
empowerment and accountability processes in such settings. Taken 
collectively, the set of  cases show that progress is possible in the 
conflict/post-conflict context despite the unfavourable terrain, but 
the paths that social action takes is heavily constrained by local 
understandings of  empowerment and accountability, the configuration 
of  pro-accountability stakeholders, the history of  the conflict and its 
effects on various groups, and how narratives are mobilised to serve 
political change. Moreover, any progress, we note, is transitory: it can 
and has been reversed. Whether or not social action is durable and has 
accountability effects, can only be judged over the long term.
As pockets of  fragility, conflict, and violence emerge in what have so 
far been relatively stable places, initial insights from these cases will 
be increasingly relevant for tackling these issues globally. Foremost, it 
seems clear that processes of  accountability and empowerment each 
move at a different pace, following their own trajectories and are only 
loosely linked. And yet, in each of  the cases, there are moments of  
opportunity when things shift and new political configurations enable 
new coalitions and action to become possible, which may or may not 
lead to accountability and empowerment gains.
One of  the key findings seems to be that processes of  empowerment 
and accountability are more likely to unfold when some precursors are 
in place that would lay out the foundations of  the pathways. A legacy 
of  conflict and repression, it turns out, plays a big part in shaping how 
actors respond to the opportunities. And the cases show that the battle 
for accountability is not only fought through formal institutions and 
against deeply entrenched interests, but also in the battlefield of  ideas, 
where simple strategies of  framing or reframing can shift the advantage 
in favour of  accountability in the eyes of  the public at large.
Notes
*  This issue of  the IDS Bulletin was prepared as part of  Action for 
Empowerment and Accountability (A4EA), an international research 
programme exploring social and political action in fragile, conflict, 
and violent settings. A4EA is a consortium led by IDS and funded 
with UK aid from the UK government. The views expressed do not 
necessarily reflect the official policies of  our funder.
  I am grateful for the incredibly helpful comments provided by 
Colin Anderson, Jonathan Fox, John Gaventa, and Peter Houtzager 
on an earlier version of  this article.
1 Anuradha Joshi, Research Fellow, Institute of  Development Studies, 
UK.
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2 See World Bank: www.worldbank.org/en/topic/
fragilityconflictviolence/overview.
3 State weakness in the sense of  the capacity and willingness to 
organise the provision of  public goods; often, they are strong in terms 
of  repression and military power.
4 For details of  the A4EA programme, see www.ids.ac.uk/programme-
and-centre/action-for-empowerment-and-accountability-a4ea/.
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